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POINT ONE 
THE RECORD CLEARLY SHOWS THAT CARTER WAS DRUNK. 
Carter's Brief argues that Carter was not drunk. 
(See Brief of Respondent at Point One.) However, that 
argument is clearly "tongue in cheek." Carter concedes that 
her blood alcohol level was .08% however long after the 
accident she was tested. (Brief of Respondent, at p. 3.) 
By Statute, a person with a .08% blood alcohol is considered 
to be drunk. See §41-6-44(1), Utah Code Ann. Indeed, 
Carter was convicted of drunk driving. (R. 413 and Carter 
Deposition, pp. 18-20.) In short, there is no good faith 
dispute on this issue. This is a drunk driving case. 
POINT TWO 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES SHOULD BE ALLOWED WHETHER 
CARTER WAS SLIGHTLY DRUNK OR DEAD DRUNK. 
Carter concedes that punitive damages can be 
awarded against an intoxicated driver. (Brief of Respondent 
at p. 12.) However, Carter argues that punitive damages 
should not be allowed where a driver is only "slightly" 
drunk. (Brief of Respondent at pp. 12-18.) 
Carter does not define the concept of being 
"slightly" drunk. Certainly, there was no expert testimony 
to explain the concept of being "slightly" drunk. 
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Where courts have bothered to determine some mini-
mum threshold, most have determined that drunk driving, in 
and of itself, is enough to get to the jury on punitive 
damages. Anderson v. Amundson, 354 N.W. 895 (Minn. App. 
1984); Campbell v. Van Roekel, 347 N.W.2d 406 (Io. 1974); 
Ingram v. Pettit, 340 So.2d 922 (Fla. 1976); Colligan v. 
Fera, 349 N.Y.S.2d 306 (1973); Svejcara v. Whitman, 487 P.2d 
167 (N. Mex. App. 1971). 
Additionally, punitive damages have been awarded 
where drunk driving causes ordinary type accidents to occur. 
Alcohol can cause a driver to rear end a car as easily as it 
can cause driving on the wrong side of the road. Thus, 
punitive damages were awarded in rear-end collisions in 
Homes v. Hollingsworth, 352 S.W.2d 96 (Ark. 1961), 
Higginbotham v. O'Keefe, 340 S.W.2d 350 (Tex. Co. App. 
1960); and Ingram v. Pettit, 340 So.2d 922 (Fla. 1976). 
They have been awarded in ordinary intersection accidents. 
Svejara v. Whitman, 487 P.2d 167 (N.M. App. 1971) and where 
there was a failure to yield the right-of-way. Adams v. 
Hunter, 343 F.Supp. 1284 (D. So. Car. 1972). Because 
alcohol causes accidents to happen in every way imaginable, 
there is no sense requiring that an alcohol related accident 
occur in some particularly negligent manner before punitive 
damages can be awarded. 
Punitive damages have also been awarded where the 
degree of intoxication was unknown; not considered important 
enough to be specified in the opinion; or where the issue of 
intoxication was contested. Campbell v. Van Roekel, 347 
2 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
N.W.2d 406 (Io. 1984); Svejcara v. Whitman, 487 P.2d 167 
(N.M. 1970; Colligan v Fera, 349 N.Y.S.2d 306 (1973). 
The legislature has set a blood alcohol level 
which creates a crime. That legislation represents what 
public policy requires. Any level which the courts might 
set above that would be at odds with the public policy of 
2 this State. Any requirement that an alcohol related 
accident occur in a particularly negligent manner would also 
be at odds with the legislature's policy and the reality 
that alcohol can cause common accidents to occur as well as 
more spectacular kinds of accidents. 
1/ Section 41-6-44(1), Utah Code Ann.: 
It is unlawful and punishable as provided in 
this section for any person with a blood 
alcohol content of .08% or greater by weight, 
or who is under the influence of alcohol or 
any drug or the combined influence of alcohol 
and any drug to a degree which renders the 
person incapable of safely driving a vehicle, 
to drive or be in actual physical control of 
a vehicle within this state. 
£/ The issue of whether the punitive damages 
standard fs satisfied is a jury question. Elkington v. 
Foust, 618 P.2d 37 (Utah, 1980); Restatement (Second) Torts, 
§908, Comment d. If it is true that Carter was only 
"slightly" drunk, that can be fairly argued to the jury. 
The jury will possibly award modest punitive damages if a 
driver is "slightly" drunk. On the other hand, a jury might 
award substantial punitive damages if a driver is dead 
drunk. In addition, it is for the jury to consider whether 
there are sufficient mitigating factors present to award no 
punitive damages. Thus, the defense of being "slightly" 
drunk can best be reserved to a jury. To hold as a matter 
of law that drunk driving alone is not enough to get to the 
jury would fly in the face of the expressed public policy of 
this state and would involve the court in endless, arbitrary 
line drawincr-
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POINT THREE 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES SHOULD BE AWARDED 
IN ADDITION TO ANY CRIMINAL PENALTIES 
Carter argues that punitive damages are not neces-
sary because drunk drivers are subject to criminal pen-
alties. (See Brief of Respondent at pp. 17 and 18.) 
It should be sufficient to note that criminal 
penalties have not stopped the carnagei 
Those courts which have considered the argument 
that punitive damages should not be awarded in drunk driving 
cases because criminal penalties exist have consistently 
rejected the argument. Harrell v. Ames, 508 P. 2d 211 (Or. 
1973); Colligan v. Fera, 349 N.Y,S,2d 306(1973); Svejcara v. 
Whitman, 487 P.2d 167 (New Mex. App. 1971); Miller v. 
Blanton, 210 S.W.2d 293 (Ark. 1948); Pratt v. Duck, 191 
S.W.2d 562 (Tenn. App. 1945). 
This court has on numerous occasions rules in fa-
vor of punitive damages even though criminal penalties were 
in existence, e.g. Holdaway v. Hall, 505 P.2d 295 
(Utah 1973), Assault; Elkington v. Foust, 618 P.2d 37 (Utah 
1980), Sexual Assault; Evans v. Gaisford, 247 P.2d 431 (Utah 
19 52) , Assault. Indeed, many other kinds of intentional 
wrongdoing which would support punitive damages would also 
be crimes. 
A 
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POINT FOUR 
THE McFARLAND RULE ON PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
IS LIMITED TO FALSE IMPRISONMENT CASES. 
A series of recent Utah cases have permitted puni-
tive damages for reckless conduct. This is also referred to 
as implied malice or malice in law. See e.g., Behrens v. 
Raleigh Hills Hospital, 675 P.2d 1179 (Utah 1979). 
Carter claims that Behrens and cases adopting the 
Behrens standard have all been overruled, sub silento by 
McFarland v. Skaggs Companies, Inc., 678 P.2d 1179 (Ut. 
1983). Specifically, Carter claims that the standard for 
punitive damages is actual malice. (As opposed to implied 
malice or malice in law.) 
However, McFarland's rationale was clearly limited 
to the peculiar questions faced in the shoplifting-false 
imprisonment situation. After an analysis of false im-
prisonment law, the McFarland court overruled the earlier 
false imprisonment case of Terry v. Zionf s Cooperative 
Mercantile Institution, 605 P.2d 314 (Ut. 1979). The 
_ The statement made in defendant's brief that the 
majority rule is that punitive damages are awarded only for 
actual malice is correct only if it is limited to false 
imprisonment cases. The cases in MacFarland cited for what 
other courts do in similar situations were all false impris-
onment cases. Three of the four out-of-state cases cited in 
McFarland come from jurisdictions which allow punitive 
damages in drunk driving situations. The majority rule 
outside the false imprisonment context is set forth in 
Restatement (Second) Torts §908 and allows punitive damages 
when there is either actual or legal malice. Pre-Terry Utah 
Supreme Court dicta also supports the award of punitive 
damages where either actual or legal malice is present. 
Wilson v. Oldroyd, 267 P.2d 759, 765 (Utah 1954); Ruga v. 
Tolman, 117 P. 54, 57 (Utah 1911); see also Powers v. 
Taylor, 379 P.2d 380 (Utah 1963). " Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
McFarland holding was expressly limited to false 
imprisonment cases and was expressed in these words: 
. . . Accordingly, we adopt as the 
appropriate standard for determining the 
availability of a punitive damages award 
in an action for false imprisonment that 
of 'malice in fact1 or 'actual malice.1 
678 P.2d at 304. 
[Emphasis added]. 
Two recent decisions of this Court, decided after 
McFarland, reaffirm that punitive damages should be allowed 
for a "reckless indifference towards. . .the rights of 
others." Synergetics v. Marathon Ranching Co., Ltd., 12 
Utah Adv. Rptr 15, 19 (Utah 1985); and Aiken, Wright & Miles 
v. Mountain States Telephone Co., 20 Utah Adv.Rptr. 20, 24 
(Utah 1985) . 
The McFarland. case is clearly limited to its own 
facts of false arrest. 
POINT FIVE 
MOST JURISDICTIONS HOLD THAT DRUNK DRIVING 
IS THE TYPE OF OUTRAGE WHICH SHOULD SUPPORT PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
Miskin's Opening Brief cites cases from 16 juris-
dictions which have permitted punitive damages in the drunk 
driving context. Since then, plaintiff has uncovered five 
more. Butters v. Mince, 616 P.2d 127 (Colo. 1980); Calloway 
v. Rossman, 257 S.E.2d 913 (Ga. App. 1977); Moore v. Bothe, 
479 S.W.2d 634 (Ky. 1972); Allers v. Willis, 643 P.2d 592 
(Mont. 1982), and Pratt v. Duck, 191 S.W.2d 562 (Tenn. App. 
6 
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1945) . These cases overwhelmingly demonstrate that drunk 
driving satisfies the classical criteria for allowing 
punitive damages. 
In addition to this overwhelming case law, the 
public policies behind the punitive damages standards 
require the availability of punitive damages in drunk 
driving cases. Ultimately, words such as actual malice, 
implied malice, reckless indifference, malice in law, are 
simply labels used for the convenience of lawyers and 
judges. The important issue behind the labels is the public 
policy of deterring outrageous conduct. The important issue 
in this case is to help stop the slaughter caused by drunk 
drivers. In Ingram v. Pettit, 340 So.2d 922 (Fla. 1976), 
the Florida Supreme Court stated that: 
The distinctions articulated in labeling 
particular conduct as "simple negli-
gence", and "willful and wanton 
misconduct" are best viewed as state-
ments of public policy. . .We would 
deceive ourselves, however, if we viewed 
these distinctions as finite legal 
categories and permitted the 
characterization alone to cloud the 
policies they were created to foster. 
Our guide is not to be found in the 
grammar, but rather in the policy of the 
state in regard to highway acci-
dents. From that perspective, we see 
that the courts and the legislature have 
evolved the notion that drunk drivers 
menace the public safety and are to be 
discouraged by punishment. 
(340 So.2d at 924.) 
Thus, we urge the Court to focus as much on the 
substance of the tragedy as on the legal labels. 
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CONCLUSION 
Drunk driving is a national tragedy. The slaugh-
ter on highways has reached epidemic proportions. Tradi-
tional solutions are not enough. As a matter of public 
policy, this Court should use punitive damages as one 
additional tool to combat this evil. 
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